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Abstract: Problem statement: A Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) is a self-created self-organized 
and  self-administering  set  of  nodes  connected  via  wireless  links  without  the  aid  of  any  fixed 
infrastructure or centralized administrator. Protecting the network layer from malicious attacks is an 
important and challenging issue in both wired and wireless networks and the issue becomes even more 
challenging in the case of MANET. Approach: In this study we propose an Umpiring System (US) 
that provides security for routing and data forwarding operations. We present three US models-
Single  (one)  Umpiring  System  (SUS),  Double  Umpiring  System  (DUS)  and  Triple  Umpiring 
System (TUS). In the umpiring system, each paricipating node of the system will have different 
roles  to  play;  some  of  the  nodes  will  be  doing  traditional  operations  of  routing  and  packet 
forwarding,  while  some  others  will  be  monitoring  the  behaviour  of  designated  nodes.  If  any 
misbehavior  is  noticed  umpires  immediately  flag  off  the  guildy  node.  Results:  We  find  that. 
Throughput with single umpire system is greater than DUS and TUS. From throughput and energy 
point  of  view  SUS  is  the  best.  But  both  false  positives  and  false  negatives  are  lower  with  TUS, 
indicating it is a better detection system. Conclusion: We envisage that our system can profitably be 
used in civilian situations where invariably nodes are lean and energy starved. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
  A Mobile  Ad Hoc  Network  (MANET) is a self-
created  self-organized  and  self-administering  set  of 
nodes connected via wireless links without the aid of 
any  fixed  infrastructure  or  centralized  administrator. 
Each node moves and operates in a distributed peer-to-
peer mode, generating independent data and acting as a 
router to provide multi-hop communication. MANET is 
ideally  suited  for  potential  applications  in  civil  and 
military environments, such as responses to hurricane, 
earthquake,  tsunami,  terrorism  and  battlefield 
conditions.  Security  is  an  important  aspect  in  such 
mission critical applications. 
  In this study we tackle the problem of securing the 
network  layer  operations  from  malicious  nodes. 
Malicious  nodes  may  disrupt  routing  algorithms  by 
transmitting a false hop count; they may drop packets, 
route the packets through unintended routes and so on. 
Our  work  rests  on  the  foundations  of  two  excellent 
systems already proposed: The twin systems of watchdog 
and pathrater (Marti et al., 2000) and SCAN (Yang et al., 
2006). A brief look at each one of them is in order. 
  Marti et al. (2000) introduced two extensions to the 
Dynamic Source Routing Protocol DSR to mitigate the 
effect of routing misbehaviors-watchdog and pathrater. 
The watchdog identifies misbehaving nodes while the 
path  rater  avoids  routing  packets  through  these 
nodes.  When  a  node  forwards  packets  the  node’s 
watchdog verifies that the next node in the path also 
forwards  the  packet.  The  watchdog  does  this  by 
listening  promiscuously  to  the  next  hop 
transmissions. If the next node doesn’t forward the 
packet then it is misbehaving. The watchdog detects 
the misbehavior and sends a message to the source, 
notifying it of the misbehaving node. 
  In SCAN (Yang et al., 2006), each node monitors 
the  routing  and  packet-forwarding  behavior  of  its 
neighbors  and  independently  detects  the  existence  of 
malicious  nodes  in  its  neighborhood.  This  is  made 
possible because of wireless nature of the medium and 
all  the  involved  nodes  are  within  each  other’s 
transmission.  In  order  to  enable  cross-checking  they 
have modified AODV protocol and added a new field 
next_ hop in the routing messages so that each node can 
correlate the overheard packets accordingly. J. Computer Sci., 7 (12): 1854-1858, 2011 
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  While  each  node  monitors  it  neighbors 
independently  all  the  nodes  in  the  neighborhood 
collaborate to convict a malicious node. An agreement 
between a minimum of k neighboring nodes is required 
for  convicting  a  malicious  node.  Once  its  neighbors 
convict  a  malicious  node  the  network  reacts  by 
depriving it of its right to access the network. In SCAN 
each  node  must  possess  a  valid  token  in  order  to 
interact with other nodes. They have used asymmetric 
key  cryptography  to  prevent  forgeries  of  tokens.  A 
group of nodes (minimum-k) can collaboratively sign a 
token,  while  no  single  node  can  do  so.  Further  each 
node has to get its token renewed periodically by its 
neighbors.  A  node  which  behaves  continuously  in  a 
good manner can get its token renewed at less frequent 
intervals as compared to a fresh entrant node. 
  Our umpiring system has been strongly influenced 
by the above two schemes. In our system all the active 
nodes have different roles to play: Routing and packet 
forwarding  and  monitoring  as  in  SCAN.  However, 
unlike  SCAN only designated nodes-umpires  monitor 
the  behaviour  of  nodes,  in  Single  Umpiring  System 
(SUS) and Double Umpiring System (DUS) (Kathirvel 
and  Srinivasan,  2011a;  2011b  and  Kathirvel  and 
Rajabushanam, 2011). In Triple Umpire System (TUS) 
the nodes in the active path play dual role of routing 
and  monitoring  as  in  watchdog.  We  also  exploit 
promiscuous  hearing  functionality  as  done  by  both 
SCAN  and  watchdog.  We  have  adopted  the  token 
concept  from  SCAN.  Token  is  a  pass  or  validity 
certificate enabling a node to participate in the network. It 
contains  two  fields:  Nodeid  and  status  bit;  nodeID  is 
considered to be immutable. Initially the status bit of all 
participating nodes is set as zero indicating “green flag” 
with freedom to participate in all network operations. It is 
assumed that a node cannot change its status bit. In SUS 
when an umpiring node finds the node it is monitoring as 
misbehaving, it sends a M-Error message to the source and 
malicious  node’s  status  bit  is  changed  using  M-Flag 
message and set to 1 indicating “red flag”. With “red flag” 
on the culprit node is prevented from participating in the 
network. In DUS and TUS the decision is made by two 
and three umpires, respectively in conjection. 
  Our objective is designing the security system is to 
keep  the  overhead  as  minimum  as  possible  while 
optimizing the throughput. We do not use encryption or 
key algorithms as done by SCAN. We find that token 
issuing and token renewals and broadcasts to announce 
convictions create very large communication overheads 
and also degrade energy performance, which SCAN has 
completely  over  looked.  There  is  no  token  renewal 
feature in our system. In our system all the nodes are pre 
issued with green tokens. They continue to enjoy the status 
until any umpire finds the node misbehaving and sends the 
M-Error and M-Flag messages and red flag is set.  
  Just  like  SCAN  in  order  to  facilitate  cogent 
promiscuous  hearing  we  have  used  “next_hop”  field 
with our AODV implementation. Our umpiring system 
can detect any false reporting of hop count during the 
route  reply  process  RREP.  In  watchdog  detection  of 
malicious action is by a single node while in SCAN it is 
done by a set of neighbors. In our system the designated 
umpiring nodes in their role as umpires carry out both 
detection and conviction. 
 
Umpiring  system  security  model:  In  the  umpiring 
system  each  node  is  issued  with  a  token  at  the 
inception. The token consists of two fields: NodeID and 
status. NodeID is assumed to be unique and deemed to 
be  beyond  manipulation;  status  is  a  single  bit  flag. 
Initially the status bit is preset to zero indicating a green 
flag. The token with green flag is a permit issued to 
each node, which confers it the freedom to participate 
in all network activities. 
  Each node in order to participate in any network 
activity, say Route Request RREQ, has to announce 
it’s  token. If  status bit is  “1”  indicating  “red  flag” 
protocol does not allow the node to participate in any 
network activity.  
  We propose three models for the umpiring system - 
Single  Umpiring  System  (SUS),  Double  Umpiring 
System (DUS) and Triple Umpiring System (TUS). We 
go  on  to  describe  each  of  these  systems  presently 
(Kathirvel and Srinivasan, 2011a, 2011b; and Kathirvel 
and Rajabushanam, 2011). 
 
Single Umpiring System (SUS): In SUS, an umpire is 
appointed  corresponding  to  each  node  in  the  active 
path, excluding source and destination is illustrated in 
Fig. 1. Thus if there are m intermediate nodes in the 
active path there will be m umpires. In Fig. 1 Ni-1, Ni, 
Ni+1 are the nodes in the active path; Ui-1, Ui, Ui+1 
are corresponding umpires. Umpire Ui can tell correctly 
whether  node  Ni  is  forwarding  the  packet  to  Ni+1 
correctly as received from Ni-1 or not, by promiscuously 
hearing  Ni’s  transmissions.  During  route  reply  process 
RREP, Ui can again verify that information transmitted by 
Ni+1 is correctly forwarded by Ni. 
  
   
 
Fig. 1: Single umpiring system model J. Computer Sci., 7 (12): 1854-1858, 2011 
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Fig. 2: Double and triple umpiring systems 
 
  When Ni is found to be misbehaving-say dropping 
packets or changing Hop_count or sequence number, Ui 
sends a M-ERROR message to the source and sets the 
status bit of guilty node Ni to “1” indicating red flag by 
M-Flag message. 
 
Double  Umpiring  System  (DUS):  In  Double 
Umpiring  System  (DUS)  (Fig.  2)  each  intermediate 
node in the active path is monitored by two umpires. 
Thus umpire Ui monitors the behavior of two nodes 
Ni-1 and Ni. Ui+1 monitor Ni and Ni+1 and so on. In 
order to enable this Ui is selected such that it is within 
the communication range of both Ni-1 and Ni. Further 
adjacent  umpires  can  communicate  with  each  other. 
There are ‘m’ intermediate nodes and (m+1) umpires. 
  If  node  Ni  misbehaves,  umpires  Ui  and  Ui+1  is 
conjunction decide and the status bit of Ni is changed to 1. 
 
Triple  Umpiring  System  (TUS):  Triple  Umpiring 
System can be explained again with reference to Fig. 2. 
For node Ni, Ni-1, Ui and Ui+1 will be umpires in the 
forward path and Ni+1, Ui and Ui+1will be umpires in 
the reverse path. If Ni behaves as determined by all the 
umpires the status bit of node Ni is set as one (Kathirvel 
and  Srinivasan,  2011a,  2011b;  and  Kathirvel  and 
Rajabushanam, 2011). 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
  We use a simulation model based on QualNet 4.5 
in  our  evaluation  (Kathirvel  and  Srinivasan,  2011a; 
2011b  and  Kathirvel  and  Rajabushanam,  2011).  Our 
performance evaluations are based on the simulations of 
100 wireless mobile nodes that form a wireless ad hoc 
network over a rectangular (1500´600 m) flat space. The 
MAC  layer  protocol  used  in  the  simulations  was  the 
Distributed Coordination Function (DCF) of IEEE 802.11. 
The performance setting parameters are given in Table 1 
(Kathirvel, 2010). 
  Before  the  simulation  we  randomly  selected  a 
certain  fraction,  ranging  from  0-40%  of  the  network 
population as malicious nodes. We considered only two 
attacks-modifying the hop count and dropping packets. 
Each flow did not change its source and destination for 
the lifetime of a simulation run. 
  We have done three studies corresponds to 10 flows 
with flows between 10 different source-destination pairs. 
Study  I  corresponds  to  SUS,  Studies  II  and  III  are 
corresponds to DUS and TUS respectively. 
  Our  experiments  are  based  on  four  important 
parameters:  
 
Throughput:  In the world of MANET, packet delivery 
ratio  has  been  accepted  as  a  standard  measure  of 
throughput. Packet delivery ratio is nothing but a ratio 
between  the  numbers  of  packets  received  by  the 
destinations  to  the  number  of  packets  sent  by  the 
sources.  We  present  in  Table  2  the  packet  delivery 
ratios in the case of 30 percentage of malicious node, 
with node mobility varying between 0-20 m sec. 
  From  Table  2  the  following  conclusions  can  be 
drawn:  
 
·  In  general  packet  delivery  ratio  decreases  as 
mobility  and  percentage  of  malicious  nodes 
increase 
·  For example, in the case of SUS packet delivery 
ratio  drops  from  71.23-63.52%  as  the  node 
mobility increases to 20 m sec 
·  SUS has higher throughput in all cases compared 
to  DUS  and  TUS.  From  the  above  study  we 
conclude that SUS fairs best as compared to other 
two models, from the point of view of throughput 
 
Failure to deduct (false negatives) probability: False 
Negatives Probability can be defined as:  
 
False  Negatives  Probability  =  number  of 
malicious  nodes  left  undetected/total  number  of 
malicious nodes 
 
  From  Table  3  the  following  conclusions  can  be 
drawn:  
·  In general false negative probability decreases as 
mobility increases 
·  As we move from SUS to TUS, there is a decrease 
in false negative probability 
 
  From the above results we conclude that TUS has 
the least false negative probability when compared with 
DUS and TUS. 
 
False accusation (false positives) probability:  It can 
be  seen  that  lowest  false  positives  probability  is 
obtained  with  TUS  (Refer  Table  4).  In  other  words 
innocent node booking is minimum with TUS. J. Computer Sci., 7 (12): 1854-1858, 2011 
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Table: 1 Parameters setting 
Simulation time   1500 sec 
Propagation model  two ray ground reflection 
Transmission range  250m 
Band width  2 Mbps 
Movement model  random way point 
Pause time  0 sec 
Traffic type  CBR (UDP) 
Payload size  512 bytes 
Number of flows  10/20 
 
Table 2: Packet delivery ratios for the 3 studies 
   Malicious nodes = 30% 
  -------------------------------------------------- 
Mobility (M sec)  SUS  DUS  TUS 
0    73.23  72.84  70.95 
5    68.86  64.18  61.51 
10    65.41  61.11  58.42 
15    64.38  60.88  58.26 
20    63.52  59.18  56.29 
 
Table 3: False negatives probability for the 3 studies 
  Malicious nodes = 30% 
  -------------------------------------------------- 
Mobility (M sec)  SUS  DUS  TUS 
0    0.1974  0.1852  0.1731 
5    0.1594  0.1513  0.1471 
10    0.0916  0.0749  0.0618 
15    0.1091  0.0988  0.0871 
20    0.1007  0.0918  0.0873 
 
Table 4: False positives probability 
  Malicious nodes = 30% 
  -------------------------------------------------- 
Mobility (M sec)  SUS  DUS  TUS 
0    0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
5    0.0136  0.0116  0.0091 
10    0.0592  0.0471  0.0354 
15    0.0764  0.0692  0.0511 
20    0.0816  0.0748  0.0612 
 
Table 5: Communication overhead 
  Malicious nodes = 30% 
  -------------------------------------------------- 
Mobility (M sec)  SUS  DUS  TUS 
0    15254  15305  15390 
5    16110  16160  16206 
10    16930  17046  17151 
15    17848  17936  18025 
20    18523  18642  18713 
 
Table 6:   Throughput  and  communication  overhead  of  30% 
malicious nodes with plain AODV 
Mobility (M sec)  0  5  10  15  20     
Throughput  70.44  45.18  37.89  32.55  32.0700 
Comm overhead  14136.00  14603.00  15082.00  15580.00  16082.0 
 
Communication  overhead  Communication  overhead 
can be evaluated based on the number of transmissions 
of  control  messages  like  RREQ,  RREP,  RERR, 
M_ERROR  and  M-Flag  messages  in  the  umpiring 
system.  We  present  the  communication  overhead 
details  in  Table  5.  We  find  that  communication 
overhead  increases  with  mobility  and  SUS  has  the 
lowest communication overhead. 
 
Analysis  of  results:  We  present  the  plain  AODV 
results  in  Table  6.  We  find  that  all  the  3  umpiring 
systems SUS, DUS and TUS yield much higher output 
as  compared  to  plain  AODV.  The  increase  in 
communication overhead ranges from 7.9% (SUS, 0 m 
sec mobility) to 16.4 % (TUS 20 m sec mobility). 
  Clearly  with  DUS  and  TUS,  with  more  umpires 
involved in detection, false negatives and false positives 
probabilities decrease. Thus with TUS we have better 
rounding up of malicious nodes. 
 
Literature work: The Key Distribution Center (KDC) 
architecture  is  the  main  stream  in  wired  network 
because  KDC  has  so  many  merits.  Efficient  key 
management,  including  key  generation,  storage, 
distribution  and  updating.  The  lack  of  Trusted  Third 
Party (TTPs) key management scheme is a big problem 
in ad hoc network(Banerjee and Dutta, 2010, Maalla et 
al.,  2009;  Kaabneh  et  al.,  2009,  Elfaki  et  al.,  2011, 
Natsheh and Buragga, 2010) (Kathirvel and Sivaraman, 
2010). All the above schemes only try to protect the 
system  from  the  attacker,  but  not  bother  about 
quarantining attackers. The twin systems of watchdog 
and pathrater (Marti et al., 2000) not only detect the 
mischievous  nodes  but  also  prevent  their  further 
participation in the network. SCAN (Yang et al., 2006) 
also has similar action, but is more comprehensive, in 
the  sense  not  only  packet  dropping  but  also  other 
misbehaviors like giving wrong hop count are covered. 
  
CONCLUSION 
 
  An umpiring system for security for mobile ad hoc 
network  has  been  proposed.  We  have  presented 
experimental results for all the 3 systems. We find that 
Throughput with single umpire system is greater than 
DUS and TUS. From throughput and energy point of 
view SUS is the best. But both false positives and false 
negatives are lower with TUS, indicating it is a better 
detection  system.  We  envisage  that  our  system  can 
profitably  be  used  in  civilian  situations  where 
invariably nodes are lean and energy starved. Further 
research work is in progress. 
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